On Sellars’s Analytic-Kantian Conception of Categories as Classifying Conceptual Roles by O'Shea, James
 1 
On Sellars’s Analytic-Kantian Conception of Categories as Classifying Conceptual Roles 
 
James R. O’Shea, University College Dublin. 
 
(To appear in:  Javier Cumpa, ed., Categorial Ontologies:  
From Realism to Eliminativism (Routledge), during 2020-2021.) 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  I argue that Sellars’s metaconceptual theory of the categories 
exemplifies and extends a long line of nominalistic thinking about the nature of the 
categories from Ockham and Kant to the Tractatus and Carnap, and that this theory 
is far more central than has generally been realized to each of Sellars’s most famous 
and enduring philosophical conceptions: the myth of the given, the logical space of 
reasons, and resolving the ostensible clash between the manifest and scientific images 
of the human being in the world.  Sellars’s distinctive contribution to this 
longstanding (if currently on the defensive) metaconceptual approach to the nature 
of ontological categories was to interpret and reconstruct it in terms of his own 
‘meaning as use’ or norm-governed inferential role semantics.  With these resources 
Sellars sought to preserve the genuine insights in the ‘realist’ or broadly platonic 
traditions while simultaneously defending the idea that in the end, as he puts it, “a 
naturalistic ontology must be a nominalistic ontology” (1980a NAO IV §129). 
 
 
 
* * * 
 
 Wilfrid Sellars saw his account of categories and of abstract entities as developing a long 
line of anti-platonist thinking about fundamental ontological categories such as substance, 
property, fact, universals, and particulars.  Sellars traced the lineage of this outlook from Ockham 
and the medieval terminist logicians, through Hume’s nominalism, to Kant’s conception of the 
categories as “pure concepts” of the understanding; and then in the twentieth century, from certain 
key “meta-conceptual” analyses in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus of “truths about our thoughts about objects 
in the world” (Sellars 1970 TTC VI §33)1 to Carnap’s analytic reconstruction of our references to 
abstract entities in terms of the metalinguistic resources of logico-linguistic frameworks.  Sellars’s 
distinctive contribution to this longstanding (if currently on the defensive) metaconceptual approach 
to the nature of ontological categories was to interpret and reconstruct it in terms of his own 
“meaning as use” or norm-governed inferential role semantics.  With these resources Sellars sought 
to preserve the genuine insights in the “realist” or broadly platonic traditions while simultaneously 
defending the idea that in the end, as he puts it, “a naturalistic ontology must be a nominalistic 
ontology” (1980a NAO IV §129).  His theory of the categories, as we shall see, turns out to be 
essential to some of Sellars’s most distinctive metaphysical and epistemological positions, including 
most notably his famous views on the myth of the given and on the ostensible “clash” between 
the manifest and scientific images of the world. 
 
 In what follows I begin by laying out some of the basic features of Sellars’s conceptual role 
account of abstract entities by focusing specifically on his account of the categories, beginning 
with his remarks on Ockham, Wittgenstein, and Kant.  Rather than addressing on this occasion 
 
1 References to Sellars’s works are by means of their now standard abbreviations in the literature, followed 
by the relevant part, chapter, section, paragraph, or page numbers.   
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the viability of his “functional classification” account of meaning and abstract entities in general 
in the face of important realist objections,2 I proceed to focus on the complex role that ontological 
categories actually play in certain key aspects of Sellars’s metaphysical and epistemological views.  
Displaying the categories at work in this way raises fundamental questions both about their nature 
and about the role of categorial ontology in general, as well as casting a different light on Sellars’s 
myth of the given. 
 
 
1.   “Toward a Theory of the Categories”: Ockham, Kant, and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
 
 
 In his 1970 article, “Toward a Theory of the Categories” (1970 TTC), Sellars presents a 
brief and highly reconstructive account according to which Ockham, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and 
Kant offer a series of insights for a possible alternative to the dominant varieties of realism about 
universals (e.g., qualities and relations) and the question of our “ontological commitment” to 
abstract entities, which Sellars traces back to Plato’s Sophist and Aristotle’s conception of the 
categories as “highest kinds” (summa genera) of entity. Plunging into the middle of things, Sellars 
illustrates the category of substance as an Aristotelian summum genus by means of the generalizing 
sequence, ‘Fido is a dog … Fido is an animal … Fido is a substance.’  The initially awkward parallel 
in the category of quality, he indicates, would suggest ‘x is a red … x is a color … x is a quality,’ 
but characteristically this becomes the sequence, ‘Red(ness) is a color … Red(ness) is a perceptible 
quality … Red(ness) is a quality’, with the abstract singular term redness highlighting the ostensible 
ontological commitment to qualities as universals.   
 
 Sellars suggests that subsequently the “first major breakthrough in the theory of categories 
came, as one might expect, in the late Middle Ages, when logic, like knighthood, was in flower” 
(1970 TTC V §17).  In TTC Sellars presents the various views he discusses in terms of his own 
inferential role account of linguistic meaning and his analogous account “mentalese” (i.e., of 
“inner” conceptual content).  Roughly speaking, dot-quoted items (e.g., a •dog•) are contrived 
common nouns that serve to classify functionally any item in any linguistic or mental-
representational system that has the same or a relevantly similar norm-governed functional role or 
“use” as that of the term illustrated between the dot-quotes, with which the language user is already 
familiar.3  Sellars then illustrates Ockham’s strategy as one of explicating, for example, “Man is a 
 
2 I have provided an overview of Sellars’s semantics and his view of abstract entities in O’Shea 2007, Chs. 
3–4 (see also deVries 2005, Chs. 2–4), including discussion of how Sellars attempted to respond to some 
of the more obvious objections to his nominalism from standard realist and model-theoretic views.  These 
include, for example, how Sellars’s conceptual role nominalism attempts (or would attempt) to address 
issues arising from the real number continuum, set theory, modality, and the various “indispensability” 
arguments that have been thought to favor varieties of platonism or other forms of realism in mathematics 
and semantics.  The latter, of course, ultimately drove Quine from his nominalism, despite his own wishes: 
“It is strange to find myself on the realist’s side of a nominalist–realist debate. I would be over there fighting 
the good fight shoulder to shoulder with Sellars were it not for the difficulties set forth. . .” (Quine 1980, 
28–30; cf. Sellars 1980a NAO I, §§21–34).   For more in-depth discussions of these and other challenges 
to Sellars’s nominalism, see Brandom 2016, Loux 1978, Seibt 1990, Sicha 1974, and the Appendix to Sellars 
1980a NAO (Correspondence with Michael Loux). 
 
3   For example, the ostensibly relational meaning statement: “ ‘dreieckig’ (in German) means triangular” is 
ultimately analyzed as a form of metalinguistic functional classification:  “ ‘dreieckigs’s (in German) are 
•triangular•s.”  For Sellars this reflects the norm-laden fact that the behavior of ‘dreieckig’s in German 
speakers’ patterns of inference and perceptual response roughly parallels the functional role of ‘triangular’s 
in English.  What I have presented is just a crude snapshot of Sellars’s view of meaning as functional 
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species” as having the sense of “•Man• is a sortal mental term” (cf. 1970 TTC V §17), and similarly 
analyzing “Socrates is a substance (a primary individual)” as “•Socrates• is a basic mental singular 
term” (1970 TTC  V §21).  Along the same lines he indicates that “Yellow (yellowness) is a quality” 
would have the sense of “The •yellow• is a (one-place) predicate (in mentalese)” and the latter 
“would ‘reduce’ to” the statement, “•Yellows• are predicates.” On this view “to be a •yellow• is to 
be an item having a certain conceptual job, which would ultimately be explained in terms of the 
word-word and word-world uniformities by virtue of which ‘yellow’s in one language and ‘gelb’s in 
German function as they do in basic matter-of-factual statements” (1970 TTC V §29).  Sellars 
sums up the general line of thought as follows: 
 
What all this amounts to is that to apply Ockham’s strategy to the theory of categories is 
to construe categories as classifications of conceptual items. This becomes, in Kant’s 
hands, the idea that categories are the most generic functional classifications of the 
elements in judgments . . . [I]nstead of being summa genera of entities which are objects “in 
the world,” . . .categories are summa genera of conceptual items . . .[T]his is, I believe, the 
correct move to make.  (1970 TTC V §§23–4) 
 
 On this general basis Sellars takes the nominalist to be in a position to grant, in one 
philosophical tone of voice, that of course there are such qualities as yellowness or triangularity, 
while nonetheless “denying that there really are such qualities” from a strictly ontological point of 
view, in light of the paraphrase of such abstract singular terms (e.g., triangularity) into the 
normative-functional classification of the relevant rule-governed conceptual role players (the 
•triangular•).  Thus “although there really are particular conceptual episodes of thinking that 
something is triangular, there really is no such entity as the quality of being triangular” (1980a NAO 
IV §31) – though there do of course really exist the various individual triangular objects to which we 
regularly respond with that conceptual classification.  Sellars considers the objection that this 
nominalist analysis merely saddles the theorist with the task of then explicating what the relevant 
conceptual roles are without thereby illicitly reintroducing “such exotic abstract entities as functions, 
roles, [or] rules” (Sellars  1980a NAO IV §137).  But he responds by suggesting that the strategy 
simply applies harmlessly to itself as an instance, i.e., that “abstract singular terms for these entities 
[i.e., functions, roles] are to be handled by the same strategy as is used to handle ‘triangularity’” (1980a 
NAO Appendix, Correspondence with Loux, §23).4   
 
 The overall upshot of Sellars’s account, as I understand his view, is that discourse about 
abstract entities and involving ontological categories is in reality a culturally evolved, metalinguistic, 
cross-language classificatory enterprise, the primary function of which in relation to our 
groundlevel empirical thought and discourse is to track conceptually (at second-order) our ongoing 
attempts to conceptually represent (at first-order) the nature of empirical reality.5  Sellars’s attitude 
 
classification, but it is hoped that this will suffice for present purpose (for more details cf. O’Shea 2007, 
Chs. 3–6, and also deVries 2015). 
 
4 For a sympathetic explication of alternative resources Sellars appeals to in relation to this problem – 
distinguishing between “ones over manys” in general, which would include the sort of “repeatability” 
involved in metalinguistic role classifications, as opposed more specifically to the sort of repeatability of 
universals that Sellars is reconstructing in terms of the former, see Brandom 2015, 244–51. 
 
5 I expand on this reading in O’Shea 2007, 63–76. Obviously one important inspiration for Sellars’s outlook 
on abstract entities in general is Carnap’s material mode/formal mode distinction in The Logical Syntax of 
Language (1934).  Sellars’s article on Carnap titled “Empiricism and Abstract Entities” (published in 1963a 
EAE, but completed by 1956) subsequently addressed the more pragmatic-empiricist outlook defended in 
Carnap 1950.  While offering important criticisms of both the earlier and later accounts in Carnap, overall 
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toward the platonic and related realist traditions, so interpreted, is far from dismissive, and we shall 
see that categorial ontology so conceived in fact plays a vital role within Sellars’s own philosophy.6 
 
 In relation to Wittgenstein’s views in the Tractatus in this connection, Sellars in “Toward a 
Theory of the Categories” is primarily concerned, as elsewhere, to execute a complex two-pronged 
strategy, partly in criticism and partly in defense of his approach.  On the one hand, Sellars employs 
his metalinguistic theory of abstract entities as sketched above to offer a deflationary, conceptual 
role-classificatory accounts of reference (e.g., the denotation of names) and exemplification (e.g., terms 
“standing for” properties), as well as of the idea of truth as a propositional “correspondence to 
facts.” All of these ostensibly world-relational semantic notions turn out, again, to be 
metaconceptual functional classifications of linguistic or conceptual roles, rather being either basic 
empirical relations or primitive metaphysical relations between language or thought and reality.  
For example, in relation to the mathematical statement, “ ‘II + II = IV’ (in L) corresponds to the 
fact that 2 + 2 =4,” Sellars holds that “it is implausible in the extreme to suppose that in this 
context ‘corresponds’ stands for a matter-of-factual relation between ‘II + II = IV’ (in L) and an 
extraconceptual entity” (1970 TTC VII §48).  (Of course, mathematical platonists will have various 
responses to make to this claim.)  On Sellars’s analysis, “correspondence to facts” then “dissolves 
into” the functional role classification:  “ ‘II + II = IV’s (in L) are •2 + 2 = 4•s,” and the factual 
character reflects “the ascription of [truth as] correct assertibility to •2 + 2 = 4•s,” with the criterion 
for mathematical truth for Sellars (with appropriate caveats) being a matter of provability within a 
formal system rather than of “word-thing connections” (1970 TTC VII §48; cf. 1968 SM IV§62, 
V §55).  Similarly at the subsentential level, denotative reference and property exemplification are 
analysed in terms of the relevant name-role and predicate-role normative-functional classifications, 
rather than in terms of primitive semantic relations to things and properties. 
 
 On the other hand, Sellars argues that in the case of empirical or “matter-of-factual” 
discourse (as opposed to the cases of mathematics or ethics, for instance), the above sorts of intra-
linguistic and inter-linguistic conceptual role classifications reflect our generally systematic, socially 
norm-governed patterns of language use and of tokenings of thoughts in response to objects and 
in learned patterns of inference.  The result is that in such empirical domains, specific sorts of 
spatiotemporal-causal relations and uniformities come to obtain (a) between language and the 
world (in norm-governed “language entry” perceptions and “language exit” volitions), and (b) in 
specific inferential patterns of linguistic tokenings, and these norm-produced and norm-governed 
natural uniformities are both entailed by and presupposed by our social-linguistic practices.  It has 
 
Sellars believed that partly as a result of Carnap’s efforts, “Today, for the first time, the naturalistic-
empiricist tradition has the fundamentals of an adequate philosophy of mind” (1963a EAE VIII §81, 282).  
In particular, he takes an adequately naturalistic philosophy of mind to eschew commitment to what he not 
unreasonably takes to be naturalistically problematic psychological relations to abstract entities as 
traditionally realistically construed. Further motivation for, but also challenges for, the sort of 
epistemological scruples in relation to realism about abstract entities that animated Sellars’s “psychological 
nominalism” can be derived from the classical dilemma raised by Benacerraf 1973. 
 
6 See Kraut 2016 for an excellent account of the plausibility and importance of Sellars’s theory of abstract 
entities, which he interprets as saving the practice of metaphysics “from the pragmatist onslaught” against 
the possibility of metaphysics.  While Kraut does not bring out the naturalistic and nominalist ambitions 
that were central to Sellars’s account, overall I find his reading to be an insightful one.  In particular I agree 
with Kraut’s view that Sellars “construes universals, propositions, and other ‘metaphysical’ constructions 
as reifications of conceptual norms, and thus as representations of the very forces – i.e., institutionally 
upheld canons of correctness – to which the pragmatist grants primacy.  On Sellars’s view, abstract entities 
and relations among them provide no grounds for normativity; such entities are, rather, shadows cast by the 
norms themselves.  Sellars thus provides an interpretation of metaphysical discourse which shows it to be 
nonproblematic by pragmatist lights” (Kraut 2016, 61; italics added). 
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not always been well understood in the literature that Sellars thereby defended a domain-specific, 
naturalistic yet norm-governed causal theory of empirical reference and of representational 
correspondence to the world (or “picturing”) in the case of basic matter-of-factual empirical 
domains, although of course his primary notions of ‘reference’ and ‘correspondence’ are the 
deflated conceptions sketched above.  For the semantic notions themselves (of reference, 
exemplification, correspondence to facts, truth) are understood throughout as various species of 
metalinguistic functional role classification that reflect those groundlevel practices and resulting 
norm-governed uniformities (cf. O’Shea 2007, 147–58).   
 
 Sellars concludes the above two-pronged analysis with the summary remark that 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus – at least as Sellars wants to read him – was therefore “right in claiming 
that reference is not a matter-of-factual relation, although the fact that a term refers entails that it 
stands in certain matter-of-factual relations” (1970 TTC VI §41).  Our conceptual categories in 
general, then, have a similarly Janus-faced character on Sellars’s account:  on the one hand 
metalinguistic and deflationary as far as “abstract entities” are concerned, but combined with a 
naturalistic ontological realism about empirical discourse and scientific theories in general.  The 
categories themselves are metaconceptual, second-order functional classifications of the most 
fundamental types of first-order conceptual roles within a given norm-governed linguistic practice 
or conceptual framework.  This is the anti-platonist, “psychological nominalist” aspect of Sellars’s 
account of abstract entities, in the spirit of Ockham and Kant.  At the same time, as far as “matter-
of-factual” discourse and empirical domains of inquiry are concerned, such first-order linguistic 
practices and resulting second-order conceptual categorizations are part of a naturalistic and realist 
account of how such practices enable us successfully to represent and track, or naturalistically 
“picture,” in Sellars’s sense, empirically mind-independent objects and events in the world. 
 
 The above sketch of Sellars’s theory of the categories in terms of his metalinguistic and 
nominalist treatment of abstract entities has been at a high level of generality.  But what role do 
categories actually play within Sellars’s epistemological views and his metaphysics of nature?  And 
what further light does that shed on his conception of the nature of the categories in general?  The 
place to begin addressing these questions is with Sellars’s use of Kant in relation to what Sellars 
called the “manifest image” of the human being in the world.   
 
 
2.  Kantian Categories in the Manifest Image – and in the Scientific Image?   
 
 
 In my view Sellars was correct to interpret Kant’s categories or “pure concepts” as 
metaconceptual or second-order rather than first-order concepts, in that they characterize the rule-
governed functions that a given first-order concept must realize in our judgments and principles 
in order to be a concept of the given categorial kind under consideration (e.g., a ‘substance’ 
concept, a ‘causal’ concept, etc.).  We need not endorse the specifics of Kant’s “metaphysical 
deduction” of twelve a priori categories by appeal to twelve corresponding a priori logical forms of 
judgment in order to take on board the general strategy of using logical form as the “clue” to the 
discovery of fundamental types of conceptual role in judgment.  Kant’s primary concern is the role 
of the categories as classifying indispensable kinds of concept as they function specifically in 
judgments and principles that, he argues, are necessary for the possibility of experience, that is, for 
the objective cognition of empirical objects in space and time.  For example, the schematized 
categorial principle of substance as, roughly, a subject that persists permanently through all change 
in its “determinations” or accidents, classifies a functional role that will be realized by whatever 
empirical concept or concepts successfully play that necessary role in making our experience (in this 
case, of any duration over time) possible.  Similarly, the second-order (“transcendental”) category 
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and corresponding principle of causality is realized by whatever first-order empirical-causal 
concepts prescribe such a necessary connection between particular empirical kinds of alteration or 
event.7  
 
 Sellars argued that Kant’s insights could be successfully reformulated and defended in ways 
appropriate to the subsequent revolutionary developments in logic, science, and the “linguistic 
turn” in twentieth-century philosophy: 
 
Thus, if logical and (more broadly) epistemic categories express general features of the 
ought-to-bes (and corresponding uniformities) which are necessary to the functioning of 
language as a cognitive instrument, epistemology, in this context, becomes the theory of 
this functioning – in short transcendental linguistics . . .  It attempts to delineate the general 
features that would be common to the epistemic functioning of any language in any 
possible world.  As I once put it, epistemology, in the “new way of words,” is the theory 
of what it is to be a language that is about a world in which it is used . . . [Kant], too, seeks 
the general features any conceptual system must have in order to generate knowledge of a 
world to which it belongs. (Sellars 1967 KTE IX §§40–1; 451–2) 
 
In various places Sellars argued that any language or conceptual framework that makes possible 
empirical cognition must exhibit certain features that, if made explicit, take the form of various 
perceptual (or “language-entry”) reliability principles, material-inferential principles with 
counterfactual force, a skeletal spatiotemporal-indexical framework, and so on, where any such 
conceptual framework will necessarily have the Janus-faced normative and corresponding 
naturalistic dimensions discussed in the preceding section (e.g., 1968 SM IV §61, V §30; 1967 KTE 
§§36–45, 448–53; 1970 TTC §§50–6).   
 
 I have discussed this modified Kantian aspect of Sellars’s philosophy in detail elsewhere 
(2007, Ch. 5; 2016) and so I will not focus on it here.  However, there is one difficult interpretive 
question that this account generates that is important for assessing Sellars’s own theory of the 
categories:  Does Sellars take his “transcendental linguistics” to deliver certain second-order 
categories and categorial principles that govern all possible humanly knowable empirical conceptual 
frameworks, even across the radically alternative fundamental categorial ontologies, from top to 
bottom, that Sellars argues characterizes the progress of scientific theorizing?  This is not a simple 
question to answer. 
 
 The category of causality provides an important case in point.  Sellars clearly holds that 
Kant’s account of the necessary applicability of the principle of causality in experience can be given 
a linguistic turn such that it becomes the claim that, for any empirically significant language able to 
serve as a “cognitive instrument” and “generate knowledge of a world to which it belongs” (1967 
KTE §40, quoted above), “it is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects 
. . . locate these objects in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label” 
(Sellars 1957 CDCM §108, 306–7; cf. Brandom 2015, Chs. 1 and 3, and O’Shea 2015).  Brandom 
thus explicates and defends what he calls the modal “Kant-Sellars thesis,” according to which the 
practice of “deploying any ordinary empirical vocabulary,” however simple (e.g., “this is red”), 
already presupposes “counterfactually robust inferential practices-or-abilities – more specifically, the 
practical capacity to associate with materially good inferences ranges of counterfactual robustness” 
(Brandom 2015, 160, italics in original).  There is no doubt that Sellars held that such non-formal 
 
7 I defend this interpretation of Kant’s categories and principles in O’Shea 2012, Chs. 4–5, and also in 
O’Shea 2015 in relation to the idea of “concepts as prescribing laws” in C. I. Lewis, Sellars, and Brandom’s 
“modal Kant-Sellars thesis.” 
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“inference tickets,” as Ryle called them, are essential to any conceptually and empirically contentful 
language about the world.   
 
 However, the category of causality, on Sellars’s view, has undergone radical changes 
throughout the history of human thought, and in particular in the modern period as a result of 
scientific developments.  Categorial ontology, for Sellars, is clearly a conceptual framework-relative 
notion, which complicates the question as to whether on Sellars’s view there are any categories or 
categorial principles that hold true across all such changes – never mind across all possible such 
changes, as envisioned above in “transcendental linguistics.”  Sellars discusses the development of 
the category of causality during the course of his idealized account of humanity’s gradual 
development from (i) an “original image” or  quasi-animistic conception of the world, in which 
nature’s own responsibilities for the rain, for death, and so on, are as it were modelled on the 
category of persons; to (ii) the more categorially “pruned” and empirically sophisticated “manifest 
image” of the perceptible world; and finally to (iii) the modern “scientific image” of the Kantian-
phenomenal world’s ultimate basis in the postulated imperceptible particles, fields, and forces that 
are continually refined and often radically reconceived as a result of the ongoing explanatory 
successes of the natural sciences (1963b PSIM II).  In telling this story Sellars offers some futher 
clarification as to what he means by “categorial” analysis in general, as follows. 
 
 Categories for Sellars, as we saw earlier, are second-order role-classifications of the most 
basic types of first-order concepts as they function in implicitly norm-governed ways within a 
given linguistic community or a given scientific theory.  Accordingly, these most fundamental 
categories – including those that in “matter-of-factual” empirical and scientific discourse seek to 
carve reality at its joints – will undergo change whenever our first-order conceptual practices and 
inquiries undergo significant conceptual change.  Sellars in various places attempted to address the 
controversial question that then arises as to how or whether it is possible to distinguish in any 
principled way such fundamental changes in concept or meaning on one hand, as opposed merely to 
particular changes in belief or particular empirical refinements involving the use of the given term 
under consideration (see, for example, 1968 SM V and 1980a NAO IV).  The most basic tool in 
Sellars’s metalinguistic account of the nature of meaning, abstract entities, and categories is a 
context-sensitive conception of judgments of functional role similarity and dfference, relative to given 
background information and whatever the particular classificatory purposes at hand may be.  
(Compare functionally comparing the role of the bowler in cricket to that of the pitcher in baseball, 
for example.)   
 
 Conceptual roles in linguistic practices and in scientific theories are thus assessed in terms 
of what are judged to be the relevant first-order norm-governed inferential patterns and language 
“entry” and “exit” transitions involving the given term, patterns which change gradually in our 
social practices and in science often dramatically over time.  With respect to the latter cases, Sellars, 
like Feyerabend and Kuhn, compares for instance the revolutionary changes in meaning involved 
in the move from Newtonian •mass• to Einsteinian •mass•, though Sellars argued that assessments 
of functional role similarity enable rational comparisons of conceptual development and change 
over time.  On Sellars’s view, then, “abstract entities, pace Plato, change” (1968 SM V §42), and 
hence so do the fundamental categories in terms of which humanity has attempted to limn the 
structure of reality.  The result on this view is that a “fundamental question with respect to any 
conceptual framework is ‘of what sort are the basic objects of the framework?’ ” (italics added), 
and what are their properties, relations, activities, and the groups to which they belong, where the 
“philosopher is interested in a classification which is abstract enough to provide a synoptic view 
of the contents of the framework but which falls short of simply referring to them as objects or 
entities” (1963b PSIM 9; II §§18–19). 
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 In relation to the example of the category of causality in particular, Sellars argues that “it 
is important not to confuse between an action’s being predictable and its being caused . . . In the 
‘original’ image, one person causes another person to do something he otherwise would not have 
done,” so that a predictable or habitual action, for instance, would not normally be regarded as 
caused in this original sense (1963b PSIM 13; II §37).  While subsequent developments in the more 
sophisticated manifest image gradually led to a narrowing of the broader animistic category of 
“persons” to apply primarily human beings, the common sense conception of causality largely 
retained its broader application, according to which something is caused to happen only when some 
relevant intervention brings about the resulting change.  Sellars’s example is that a billiard ball’s 
continuing to roll in a straight line on a smooth table is predictable, but would not ordinarily or in 
the manifest image be said to be “caused.”  Sellars is among those thinkers who hold that a 
“distinctive trait of the scientific revolution,” in contrast to the above “manifiest” conception of 
causality, is “the conviction that all events are predictable from relevant information about the 
context in which they occur, not that they are all, in any ordinary sense, caused” (ibid.).  
 
 In fact, Sellars contends that the tendencies of modern theoretical science, combined with 
what he argues are the categorial changes that are and will be required to provide philosophical 
solutions to the deepest problems of mind and metaphysics, together suggest that an all-
comprehensive alternative categorial framework to that of the manifest image is in fact what will be 
required in order to carve reality at its joints.  Sellars’s envisioned alternative framework, roughly 
speaking, is a neo-Humean physicalist ontology consisting of patterns and uniformities of non-
durational “pure processes” required by physics as well as, Sellars argues, by an adequate ontology 
of qualitative sensory consciousness.  The result, as he puts it, would be “a truly heracleitean 
ontology” according to which there “are no objects” as the ontological category of object has usually 
been understood (including abstract objects), but rather all such categorial frameworks would be 
“replaceable by” or “eliminable in favor of” a nominalistic pure process ontology according to which 
the “world is an ongoing tissue of goings on.”  As far as the category of causality in particular is 
concerned, in this replacement ontology there would be no causal powers or “potentialities in the 
basic objects” or pure processes that serve as the ultimately real posits or “logical atoms” of the 
framework (1981 FMPP II §§95, 103–4). 
 
 Returning, finally, to what we saw is Sellars’s modified Kantian idea of a “transcendental 
linguistics” that “attempts to delineate the general features that would be common to the epistemic 
functioning of any language in any possible world” (1967 KTE IX §41), what do Sellars’s views 
above concerning causality suggest about the question I raised earlier:  namely, whether all such 
empirical-linguistic frameworks must include conceptual resources that, when made explicit, 
would include the category of causality?  Kant’s own empirically realist conception of objective 
causal necessitation within the realm of (phenomenal) nature was evidently a modal realist one:  
the altering states of his “basic objects” as phenomenal substance within the spatiotemporal world 
– roughly, permanent matter constituted by universal forces of attraction and repulsion – are 
necessarily categorially conceived as subject to first-order empirical laws of objective physical 
necessitation.  Is there a tension between the fact that in his writings on Kant Sellars defends 
Kant’s arguments for this conclusion (i.e., an empirical realism about the causal modalities), yet 
the categorial framework of his own alternative heracleitean or pure process ontology purges 
objective empirical reality of the causal modalities, as least as realistically construed in terms of 
objective necessitation in nature?   
 
 In assessing this question we should note that Sellars’s various reconstructions of Kant’s 
arguments are framed in terms of his own meta-linguistic, material-inference license conception 
of causal inference, an account which Sellars always viewed as consistent, at the end of the day, 
with an underlying Humean or scientific ontology of the objective uniformities and patterns that 
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are thereby – i.e., as a result of these norm-governed material-inferential practices – naturalistically 
represented or tracked (i.e., “pictured”).  For example, in his most substantial treatment of the 
causal modalities Sellars argued  “that the picture of the world in terms of molar things and their 
causal properties points beyond itself to a picture of the world as pure episode” (1957 CDCM 
§51).  Such tracking of uniformities and patterns of “pure episodes” or “pure processes” (1957 
CDCM §§51–2) within any humanly possible (but also in this case, scientifically ideal) 
representational system, will, as I understand Sellars’s view, still require diachronic material 
inference tickets, as discussed earlier.  In the case of this alternative pure process ontology, 
however, this would involve the explicit recognition that objectively speaking there are no 
necessitations “in the world” over and above the episodic uniformities that our scientifically refined 
inference tickets have enabled us to represent and track.  
 
 From the perspective of the manifest image ontology of the world, as well as from the 
perspective of many philosophers such as Brandom who are otherwise inspired by his views, 
Sellars’s ideal of a heracleitean and nominalist categorial ontology of pure processes in particular 
has appeared to be strikingly revisionary and implausibly reductive in various ways.  This is 
currently a matter of lively debate, however, as the various contributions to the recent volume on 
Sellars and His Legacy amply testify (O’Shea, ed. 2016).  It is clear that the heart of Sellars’s 
philosophy – his naturalism with a normative turn, as I have characterized it (2007) – was devoted to 
attempting to show that there would be nothing even in such an all-comprehensive physicalist and 
nominalist ontology that would threaten our status as persons, and in particular as conceptual 
thinkers, experiencers, and rational agents who both institute and are governed by the 
intersubjective functional norms that make such personhood possible in the first place.  Broadly 
speaking, this is because all of the conceptual capacities relevant to our personhood are normative-
functional realities that Sellars attempted to conceive consistently with their full physical 
realization, however scientifically revisionary and metaphysically comprehensive the latter 
nominalist ontology might become.   
 
 What is particularly interesting in relation to the role of categories and categorial 
metaphysics in this overall story are the ways in which they figure in Sellars’s working out of the 
details as to how the idealized manifest and scientific images are thus to be stereoscopically fused 
with one another within one “synoptic vision” and one categorial ontology of the human being in 
the world.  In the final section I will close by briefly examining one particular important issue in 
this regard, namely, the relatively neglected but essential role of the categories in Sellars’s famous 
rejection of the “myth of the given,” which was itself more central than is often realized to his 
own attempted reconciliation or synoptic fusion of the manifest and scientific images. 
 
 Before leaving the present topic, however, I should note that Robert Brandom’s recent  
sophisticated “pragmatic metalinguistic” and inferentialist analyses of Sellars’s views on both the 
categories and the causal modalities (e.g., 2015, 2016), which go into insightful detail in relation to 
their basis in Sellars’s semantics and his theory of abstract entities, also contain a detailed critique 
of Sellars’s attempt to draw the ontologically nominalist conclusions from those metalinguistic analyses 
that I have highlighted above.  Brandom sums up his critique of this nominalistic aspect of Sellars’s 
views this way: 
 
What I think is right about what Sellars does here is the progress he makes in specifying a 
distinctive expressive role that ontologically categorizing vocabulary plays relative to the 
use of empirical descriptive vocabulary: the kind of functional classification he thinks it is 
performing. Sellars himself draws invidious nominalistic ontological conclusions from his 
characterization of the expressive role of this sort of vocabulary. He takes his account of 
that expressive role to show that it is wrong to think we are describing anything when we 
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talk about properties, or referring to anything when we use terms like “circularity” or 
“redness.” That is his nominalism. I [argue] that he fails to show that we should draw these 
ontological conclusions from his convincing expressivist analysis of the use of this sort of 
vocabulary. (Brandom 2015, 28) 
 
More specifically, the conclusion of Brandom’s argument is that Sellars’s metalinguistic analysis of 
abstract entities and categories “is at most compatible with” his “ontological nominalism,” but 
provides no compelling argument for it (2016, 43–5); and furthermore, Brandom suggests, a realism 
about properties, propositions, facts, the causal modalities, and so on, is also consistent with, but 
philosophically preferable to, ontological nominalism.  Not even Sellars’s notoriously strong 
scientific naturalism yields an argument for the latter, according to Brandom, since “the language 
of science is just as much up for alternative interpretations, nominalistic and otherwise, as ordinary 
language” (ibid.).   
 
 I think this conclusion is not surprising.  The burden of argument typically does fall on 
ontological nominalists to show that their more parsimonious resources are sufficient for the needs 
of semantics, mathematics, and science, consistently with the ostensibly realist surface grammar.  
The naturalistic motivations of most nominalists usually do derive from elsewhere, and in Sellars’s 
case he viewed his metalinguistic “psychological nominalism” about abstract entities and categories 
as essential to combatting “the persistent (if currently repressed) notion that relations between 
minds and abstract entities must be invoked by an adequate psychological theory of the ‘higher 
processes’ ” (1963a EAE 436, II §12).8  Sellars explicitly disagreed, on epistemological grounds, 
with Quine’s Duhemian-holistic reasons for being at naturalistic peace with such seemingly non-
naturalistic (non-spatiotemporal, non-causal) positing of abstract entities realistically construed (cf. 
1980a NAO I §§24–34), posits which continue to dominate current philosophy of mind, language, 
mathematics, and modality.  However, if Sellars’s metalinguistic conception of the categories and 
of abstract entities really is fit for its purposes (I have noted that this is a question up for wider 
debate), then I would think that its consistency with ontological nominalism arguably ought to 
count strongly in its favor, at least with the many philosophers who, for a variety of reasons, 
continue to aim for some version of a non-eliminativist yet ontologically naturalistic philosophy 
of mind and agency. 
 
 
3. Categorial Ontology at Work: Sellars’s Metaphysics and the Myth of the Given 
 
 
 Given its prominence both in Sellars’s thinking and in the literature, the problem of the 
so-called “myth of the given” and the related question of the ontology of the sensible qualities 
(such as color) is the most obvious case to consider in relation to exhibiting categories and 
categorial analysis at work in Sellars’s philosophy.  In employing his theory of the categories as 
metaconceptual functional classifications of fundamental types of norm-governed conceptual 
roles, Sellars holds that with respect to any given conceptual framework (though in this passage 
referring specifically to the “manifest image”), “there is a correct and an incorrect way to describe 
this objective image which we have of the world in which we live”; and more generally, “there is 
truth and falsity with respect to” any philosophical attempt to analyze the categorial structure of 
any given framework.  An important part of categorial ontology, for Sellars, is the attempt to 
diagnose and correct such mistaken analyses (1963b PSIM III §§38–9).  The recurrent 
philosophical idea of “the given,” in its various forms, “as a piece of professional – epistemological 
 
8 I have examined this aspect of Sellars’s psychological nominalism, in relation to abstract entities and the 
myth of the given, in O’Shea 2017. 
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– shop talk” (EPM I §1), is a prime example of such a mistaken analysis, according to Sellars, but 
most importantly for present purposes, in this case his theory of the categories plays a distinctive 
and often neglected role in what is perhaps his most well-known philosophical contribution.  
  
 It is not always realized the extent to which for Sellars himself, in contrast to many of the 
more recent adaptations of his epistemological and semantic views on the myth of the given and 
the holistic “logical space of reasons,”9 the most important result of his critique of the myth is that 
in his view it first makes possible the only genuinely adequate, fully naturalistic synoptic fusion of 
the manifest and scientific images of the human being in the natural world.10  Sellars diagnoses the 
myth of the given as coming in many different forms, including both empiricist and intellectualist 
or rationalist versions, and in neither case restricted to its most familiar and prevalent guise of 
epistemological foundationalism.  Roughly, the latter is the idea that there is a stratum of noninferential 
knowledge or direct apprehension (or “acquaintance”), whether of particulars, properties, facts, or 
ways of experiencing or appearing, which is such that (a) it is not only noninferential – Sellars has 
no problem with noninferential cognition per se – but most importantly such items of knowledge 
allegedly (b) “presuppose no knowledge of other matter of fact, whether particular or general,” 
while nonetheless also (c) “constitut[ing] the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims – 
particular and general – about the world” (EPM VIII §32).  The most well-rehearsed Sellarsian 
arguments against any such alleged epistemic givens usually attempt to show, to put it in a nutshell, 
that either (i) the given does not have the right propositional or conceptualized form to provide 
any reason or justification for any empirical thought or claim within the “logical space of reasons” 
(EPM VIII §36), thus violating (c); or (ii) if the given is taken to have a sufficiently conceptualized 
form to be responsive to satisfy (c), it can in each case be shown not to be presuppositionless in 
the way intended by the philosopher appealing to the given, thus violating (b). 
 
 However, what I think Sellars argues can be seen to underpin such foundationalist 
epistemologies are various forms of a more basic and typically unexamined assumption. This is 
the often implicit assumption that in some cases we are directly aware of some sorts of item – 
whatever these sorts may be, whether conscious states of ourselves, or properties (or property-
instances), or external objects themselves, or directly evident propositions or intuited rational 
relations, for instance – and that we are aware of them as the sorts of item that they are, simply in 
virtue of immediately experiencing or directly apprehending them in this way (whatever that way 
may be), and hence independently of, and so not presupposing, any other capacities or abilities 
that we may possess or have acquired.   
 
 For example, Sellars argues that, despite their many other differences, “Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume. . .all take for granted that the human mind has an innate ability to be aware of certain 
determinate sorts – indeed, that we are aware of them simply by virtue of having sensations and images” (EPM 
VI §28, italics in original), for instance, in having a sensation of red or of redness. Today this might 
 
9 I have in mind the deservedly infuential Sellars-inspired views of Rorty, Brandom, and McDowell.  In my 
view pointing out this difference in Sellars’s own aims with respect to the myth of the given in relation to 
the possibility of an all-comprehensive scientific naturalism and ontological nominalism does not diminish 
the value of those more recent appropriations in relation to their own projects and in shedding revealing 
light on Sellars’s own views in key respects. 
 
10 A distinction that is crucial for understanding Sellars’s “stereoscopic” integration of the manifest and 
scientific images, but one side of which will be entirely suppressed in what follows, is that while for Sellars 
the manifest image ontology of colored, persisting physical objects undergoes wholesale explanatory and 
hence ontological replacement in the ideal scientific image of the world, the normative-functionally 
constituted domain of persons, meaning, knowledge, truth, and value, is supposed to be preserved in this 
revisionary object-ontology of the ideal synoptic vision.   
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be put by many philosophers of mind, whether they be foundationalists in epistemology or not, in 
terms of our being directly aware of or consciously experiencing qualia of various sorts, or perhaps 
being aware of the conscious character of other aspects of our own occurrent mental states, 
depending on the given view at hand.  Other philosophers have recently defended more 
intellectualist or rationalist versions of the given in terms of the direct intuition of rational relations. 
 
 The arguments in this domain remain subject to lively controversy, of course, but what 
Sellars attempted to argue is that, at a deeper “categorial” level, as he characterizes it, even the 
most basic immediate experiences or direct apprehensions of various sorts – whether these are 
assumed to be sorts of experiencings themselves, or to be sorts of experienced or apprehended 
objects, qualities, or relations – are themselves not as presuppositionless as they are implicitly 
assumed to be.  This is the case whether or not the overall epistemology that scaffolds such basic 
awareness of sorts (or sorts of awareness) is taken to have a foundationalist structure.  In his later 
writings such as his 1981 Carus Lectures (1981 FMPP; see also 1980b BLM VI), but developing 
essentially the same point he had made above in EPM VI in 1956, Sellars puts it this way: “perhaps 
the most basic form of what I have castigated as ‘The Myth of the Given’ ” may be stated in terms 
of the following “principle”:  “If a person is directly aware of an item which [in point of fact, i.e. 
from the standpoint of the ‘best explanation’] has categorial status C, then the person is aware of 
it as having categorial status C” (1981 FMPP I §44; the bracketed interpolation is from the principle 
as stated at 1980b BLM VI §122).  I have elsewhere called this Sellars’s “myth of the categorial given” 
(2007 Ch. 5: 115), arguing that this is typically the deeper basis of his familar arguments against 
the myth of the epistemically foundationalist given. 
 
 Sellars’s reference to an item’s having “categorial status C,” and hence his own 
understanding of what is perhaps the most basic form of the myth of the given, is an application 
of his views on the categories as metaconceptual functional classifications.  As we have seen, this 
brings in its wake the importance of conceptual change and hence of changes in categorial 
ontological frameworks in our ongoing attempts to reconceive and explain the nature of things.  
Categories, as second-order concepts that serve to classify functionally and normatively the most 
basic types of first-order concepts in terms of which we experience the world, are thus implicit in 
any conceptual framework put to use in describing and explaining the world, whether that 
framework be the “manifest image” of perceptible physical objects (colored, middle-sized dry 
goods) and persons as rational agents, or the ongoing scientific images (or the “regulative ideal” 
of “the” complete scientific image) of the human being and the world.  The “categorial status” of 
any item is thus framework relative,  and dependent upon a view of conceptual change according 
to which it is always an open and fallible question just what is the best explanation or the ultimately 
correct ontological categorization of whatever it is that we conceptualize and experience within 
whatever conceptual framework we have inherited or are assessing, whether scientific or manifest.   
 
 The pivotal case that Sellars is discussing in the Carus Lectures when he brings up the 
myth of the categorial given concerns “The Place of Color in the Scheme of Things,” to borrow 
the title of Jay F. Rosenberg’s insightful “Roadmap to Sellars’ Carus Lectures” (2007, Ch. 9).  
Sellars contends that our ordinary first-order awarenesses of such sensible qualities as the red or 
redness involved in seeing (or vividly seeming to see) a red apple, embody an implicit ontological 
categorization that is as fallible and replaceable as any other implicit categorization of any 
“repeatable” item in experience.  I have followed Sellars in using the ontologically neutral term 
items instead of, for example, qualia, states, objects, properties, qualities, contents, sensations, impressions, 
features, repeatables, ideas, sense-data, characters, tropes, et al.  This is because what sort of items these items 
really are – for example, whether they are features of external physical objects, or rather states of 
perceivers themselves; whether they are “repeatables” or particulars (and in what sense); whether 
they are mental or physical, adverbial or substantive, and so on – is according to Sellars not 
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something that is directly “given” independently of implicit conceptual categorization (or in the 
case of infants and some animals, at least “proto-conceptual” categorization).  How such items, 
whatever they may be, are (second-order) categorized will in each case be implicit in the material-
inferential conceptual structure our first-order characterizations of such items, which will itself 
depend upon the particular fallible conceptual frameworks in terms of which we confront reality 
in both ordinary life and in various stages and kinds of inquiry.  In the case of our concepts of 
sensible qualities in particular, Sellars thoughout his works provides detailed accounts of the 
complex ontological recategorizations, both scientific and metaphysical, that he thinks such 
concepts both have undergone and must further undergo.  Any selective “highlight real” sketch 
of his account of the sensible qualities would include the following general progression.   
 
 Sellars’s argues that the correct categorial analysis of our ordinary or “manifest” conception 
of the world – say in the case of the visible surface of a red apple I see in front of me –  is that our 
manifest conceptions are directly realist in character, in the sense that what we take ourselves to see 
is a certain physical expanse of red skin as part of a persisting, physical apple.  We also have the 
idea, both within the manifest image of common life and as refined empirically due to scientific 
developments (see Sellars’s “myth of Jones” account in EPM X–XVI), that in seeing the red apple 
we are caused to have corresponding visual sensations or “sense impressions” of a correspondingly 
appropriate sort, in this case, sensations of red (or more specifically, the sensation of a particular 
red expanse), the character of this sensing being also dependent upon the lighting, the state of 
one’s sense organs and brain, and so on.  Sellars throughout his works then traces and develops a 
complex story about how our combined phenomenological, scientific, and metaphysical inquiries 
into the resulting problems raised by the nature of our sense experiences, both veridical and non-
veridical experiences, have led (and continue to lead) to increasingly sophisticated accounts and 
disputes concerning the proper conceptualization and most adequate theoretical account of the 
place of color and other sensible qualities in the scheme of things.   
 
 Sellars himself ends up defending a rather radical view according to which, on the ultimately 
correct scientific and metaphysical categorial ontology of the world, as far as we can now 
coherently envision its structure according to our own best accounts, “the common-sense world 
of physical objects in Space and Time is unreal” (EPM IX §83).  That is, the manifest categorial 
ontology of persisting and intrinsically colored physical objects will have been (and has already 
gradually begun to be) replaced by a competing and explanatorily more successful scientific categorial 
ontology.  According to the latter, on Sellars’s reckoning, our experiences of the sensible qualities 
of things are ultimately to be fundamentally reconceived (and hence, recategorized) in such a way 
that – to put it very crudely – the given “expanse of red” ostensibly perceived “out there” on the 
surface of the apple finds its true ontological home, first, as an adverbial state of sensing in the of-
a-red-expanse manner in the perceiver, and then ultimately as a “pure process” partly constituting 
when we would categorize (in macro-terms) as the perceiver’s central nervous system.  (For brief 
classic statements, see Sellars 1963b PSIM 37, VI §107, and EPM XVI §61; for the fuller account, 
see 1981 FMPP passim.)   
 
 The key point arising from this account of the sensible qualities in relation to the myth of 
the categorial given, for Sellars, is that an “expanse of red could be something actual” and yet turn out 
to be correctly categorized, in the end, in accordance with one of several different and 
incompatible ontological alternatives: for example (as Sellars puts it at one point), as being itself 
“either (1) a sense datum in visual space, (2) a manner of sensing, or (3) a spatial constituent of a 
physical object” (1981 FMPP I, §88; numbering added).  Sellars argues that his givennist 
opponents, no matter how much they profess to be neutral with respect to such conceptual 
categorizations and recategorizations of the “immediately given” (in the case of the “sense-datum 
theorists,” for instance), or perhaps to be providing an entirely pre-
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(Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) or linguistic analysis (Austin, Strawson) of the ordinary lifeworld, 
nonetheless inevitably presuppose an implicit categorization of such items that is incompatible 
with one or another of the possible ontological and scientific alternatives.  For Sellars these implicit 
categorizations become particularly visible when seen by contrast with the possibility of his own 
radically revisionary scientific categorial ontology of sensory consciousness and of the physical 
world as a whole.   
 
 That is the real reason why the myth of the given was so important to Sellars: only a firm 
grip on the myth of the categorial given as a myth, he held, first opens up and keeps alive the 
coherent possibility of the sort of radical scientific and metaphysical recategorization of both the 
nature of physical reality and of so-called “immediate experience” that Sellars took to be essential 
to an ultimately correct scientific categorial ontology of our own overall place in the scheme of 
things.  Earlier I briefly alluded to the fact that, in addition to the key role of the categories in 
relation to the myth of the given and Sellars’s scientific naturalist ontology discussed in this section, 
Sellars also viewed his “psychological nominalist” metaconceptual theory of the categories and of 
abstract entities in general as equally indispensable for the possibility of a genunely naturalistic 
ontology.  Sellars rejects as insufficient the sort of merely methodological naturalism espoused by 
Quine, which is in principle consistent with the positing of any type of entity, whether it be 
Homeric gods or cartesian souls or (as Quine argues science does require) abstract mathematical 
objects such as sets.  As Sellars wrote in a letter to Quine in 1978:  
 
I suspect that our major disagreement continues to lie in the area of ontology.  I simply do 
not see how to fit platonic objects (classes and sets) into a naturalistic framework.  Bluntly 
put: If sets are abstract objects, how does the mind get in touch with them?  (See my. . 
.[Sellars here refers to his 1963a EAE].)  I would use the same strategy with sets as I use 
with attributes and propositions.  Statements about triangularity are to be parsed as 
statements about any •triangular•.  We ‘get in touch with triangularity’ by acquiring the 
ability to use •triangular• tokens.  (Sellars’s letter to Quine as quoted in Sellars 1980b BLM, 
VI §190; see also  1980a NAO I §§32–4)11 
 
 The question of whether or not the sort of comprehensive scientific-naturalist categorial 
ontology and thoroughgoing nominalism that Sellars envisioned is really achievable is beyond the 
scope of what I have attempted to show here.  What I have argued is that Sellars’s metaconceptual 
theory of the categories exemplifies and extends a long line of nominalistic thinking about the 
nature of the categories from Ockham and Kant to the Tractatus and Carnap, and that this theory 
is far more central than has generally been realized to each of Sellars’s most famous and enduring 
philosophical conceptions: the myth of the given, the logical space of reasons, and resolving the 
ostensible clash between the manifest and scientific images of the human being in the world. 
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